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I. The Warsaw Convention1
The Warsaw Convention, adopted in Warsaw, Poland, in 1929, provided
for uniformity of documentation such as airline tickets and waybills, and
also for limitation of potential liability of air carriers in the event of
accidents by airplanes in international travel.
The limitation of the carrier's liability for personal injury or death, to
each victim or his family, was set at 125,000 gold francs which is equiva-
lent to $8,291.87. The Hague Protocol, 2 which entered into force August
1, 1963, modified the Warsaw Convention by doubling the maximum
liability of airlines in international travel to $16,582. This Protocol was not
ratified by the United States but would nevertheless apply to a United
States citizen whose flight originates and terminates in countries both of
which are signatories to the Hague Protocol, when there is no agreed
stopping place in the United States.
On May 13, 1966, the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States
approved the Montreal Interim Agreement. 3 The signatories thereto were a
number of international airlines having landing privileges in the United
States. The Agreement raised the maximum liability to $75,000 when the
international flight originates or terminates in the United States or the
United States is an agreed stopping place. The Agreement also provided
that the potential liability of the air carriers is regardless of fault; i.e., a
carrier would be potentially liable for injury or death in international air
travel up to a maximum of $75,000, whether or not it could be proved
149 Stat. 3000- 3026, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. The treaty is officially known as "Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air."2The Protocol was concluded at The Hague, Netherlands on September 28, 1955.3The Agreement was brought about mainly by the efforts of the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). For events and negotiations leading to the Montreal Agree-
ment, see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
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negligent.4 Neither the Hague Protocol nor the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment altered the provisions of the Warsaw Convention relating to willful
misconduct. In such case the international carrier would be liable for full
damages to the victim or his personal representative.
II. Attacks on the Convention by American Courts
The first major attack on the Warsaw Convention by American courts
was Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,5 decided February 16, 1965, by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Plaintiff's
decedent, Lieutenant Frederic T. Mertens, boarded an airplane under
military orders at Travis Air Force Base, San Francisco, to accompany
certain material loaded on the plane, to Tachikawa Air Force Base, Tokyo,
Japan. The plane, owned and operated by Flying Tiger Line, Inc., had been
chartered by the United States for the transportation of military cargo and
personnel to military destinations.
While the aircraft, with plaintiff's decedent aboard, was parked on the
ramp about ready to take off, a ticket was delivered to Lieutenant Mertens.
The ticket contained a statement concerning limitation of liability which
was printed in such a manner as to be virtually unnoticeable and unread-
able.
Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention states:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none
the less be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier
accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered, he shall
not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability.
The plaintiff argued that no passenger ticket was delivered to the dece-
dent Mertens or, in the alternative, even if the ticket was in fact delivered
to the decedent, it was never adequately delivered to him as required by
Article 3(2).
The court stated that, with proper delivery of a ticket containing a
properly printed statement of limitation of liability, a passenger would have
reasonable opportunity to take measures to protect himself against the
limitation of liability. Examples of such self-protective measures, the court
said, would be deciding not to take a flight, entering into a special contract
with the carrier, or taking out additional insurance for a flight. The court
further stated that under all of the circumstances, it could not be said that
4The United States in September, 1969, in Montreal submitted a proposal to the Legal
Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization to establish a $100,000 maximum
on absolute liability.
5341 F.2d 851.
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Lieutenant Mertens had a reasonable opportunity to take any measures to
protect himself against the limitation of liability, regardless of the fact that
the measures available to him might have been circumscribed because he
was a military courier. This decision then avoided the limitations of the
Convention because delivery of a ticket containing a statement as to
limited liability was not made until after the passenger boarded the plane,
and also because the limitation statement was printed in such a manner as
to be both unnoticeable and unreadable.
Eight months later, on October 25, 1965, Warren v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc.6 was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The United States Military Air Transport Service (MATS), pur-
suant to a contract, arranged for Flying Tiger to provide air transportation
for servicemen from Travis Air Force Base in California to Tan Son Nhut
Air Base in Saigon, Vietnam. At the foot of the ramp, just before boarding
the plane, each pasenger was given a boarding ticket. On the front of the
ticket it was stated that the transportation was ". . . subject to the rules
relating to liability established by the Convention .... On the back of the
tickets there appeared conditions referring to the Convention. The trial
court found it would be difficult to read the fine print on the back of the
tickets without a magnifying glass.
Flight insurance had been available in the Travis Air Force Base termi-
nal, and also in the terminal at Honolulu, where the plane made a
three-hour stop. After leaving Honolulu, the plane stopped at Wake Island
and Guam, and then took off for Clark Air Force Base in Manila, P.I.
which it never reached. The plane has not been seen nor heard from since.
In its decision, the appellate court referred to Article 3(2) of the Con-
vention (quoted above) providing that if the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered, it would not be permitted
to avail itself of the Convention provisions which exclude or limit its
liability. The court also referred to Article 3(1) which reads:
For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right
to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises
that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the trans-
portation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention.
6352 F.2d 494.
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Article 3(1)(e) was interpreted by the court to mean that the purpose of
such statement is to notify passengers of the applicability of the Con-
vention, thus giving them an opportunity to take steps to protect against
the limitation of liability. The court stated the most common self-protective
measure to be the procurement of additional flight insurance, but held:
None of the passengers were afforded a reasonable opportunity of even
reading the ticket, much less obtaining additional insurance, before they were
accepted by boarding the plane. The passengers were thereby deprived of a
right which was intended to be afforded them as concomitant to the carrier's
right to limit its liability.
Citing Mertens, the court went on to say that it was immaterial that the
passengers could have purchased additional flight insurance at Honolulu,
an intermediate stop on the flight. Warren and Mertens are much the same.
The main factual difference is that in Mertens, the passenger was already
on the plane which was about ready to take off, when a ticket was deliv-
ered to him; in Warren, the tickets were given to the passengers just before
they boarded the plane.
In this sense, the Warren case went a step further in avoiding the
limitation provisions of the Convention, since the passengers were given
tickets before boarding the plane and not afterward. Nevertheless, the
airline was not permitted to avail itself of the limitation provisions because
the delivery of the tickets did not take place sufficiently in advance of
boarding to permit the passengers to read their tickets or purchase addi-
tional flight insurance.
It may be that after the decision of Mertens, Flying Tiger sought unsuc-
cessfully to protect itself by issuing tickets to passengers before boarding
its planes. The opinion of the court in Warren (p. 497) states that the
"stewardesses were given written instructions by Flying Tiger not to allow
any passenger to board the plane without a boarding ticket."
In an additional sense, the Warren case went further than Mertens,
since, in Warren, the passengers could have purchased flight insurance in
Honolulu after having had an opportunity to examine their tickets during
the trip from Travis Air Force Base to Honolulu, assuming that they could
make out and understand the printed matter thereon concerning the Con-
vention. Nevertheless, the court held the Convention inapplicable and the
plaintiffs prevailed.
Fourteen months after the Warren decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its decision in Lisi v. Ali-
talia-Line Aere Italiana, S.p.A. 7 on December 16, 1966. Defendant Ali-
7253 F.Supp. 237, aff d 370 F.2d 508; certiorari granted 389 U.S. 926; judgments affd
by an equally divided court in 20 L.ed. 2d 27 (1968); rehearing denied 20 L.ed. 2d 671
(1968).
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talia's airplane crashed in Ireland en route from Rome to New York. The
passengers had received their tickets three to thirty-six days before depar-
ture. Hence there was adequate time to read the tickets, including any
statement or conditions thereon relevant to the Warsaw Convention.
On the front of the ticket, in exceedingly small print, was the message:
"Each passenger should carefully examine this ticket, particularly the Con-
ditions on Page 4." The trial judge characterized this notice to passengers
as so "camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions of Con-
tract' crowded on page 4, [as to be] both unnoticeable and unreadable.
Indeed, the exculpatory statements on which defendant relies are virtually
invisible. They are ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and
unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else. The
simple truth is that they are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is
concealed."
The appellate court ruled that the passengers were entitled to reasonable
notice of the Convention's limitation-of-liability provisions, and that even
though the required notice appeared on the tickets, and the tickets were
delivered sufficiently in advance of departure, the notice was virtually
invisible.
Thus, Lisi differed from Mertens and Warren by denying the limitation
provisions of the Convention only because notice of these provisions did
not appear clearly and legibly. Previously, Mertens and Warren denied the
limitation provisions because of lack of proper and timely delivery of
tickets containing notice of limitation of liability. Mertens and Warren did
mention the question of legibility of the notice, but only in passing, their
decision being based essentially on the question of delivery. Lisi did not
question delivery at all, but denied limitations for lack of clarity of the
notice.
The next and latest case attacking the Warsaw Convention was decided
in the Circuit for Cook County (Chicago), Illinois on November 7, 1968, in
the case of Burdell et al. v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. et al.8 On
March 4, 1966, plaintiffs' decedent, Frank Burdell, was aboard a plane
owned by defendant Canadian Pacific Airlines en route from Hong Kong
to Tokyo. The plane crashed at Tokyo Airport while attempting to land in
a thick fog.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Canadian Pacific
moved to dismiss the action, alleging lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and, alternatively, because of improper-venue.
The court held for plaintiffs, reasoning that Article 28 of the Convention
restricting the forum for bringing suit to Singapore, Hong Kong or Canada
8No. 66 L 10799. The case was settled on appeal for $215,000.
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was in effect a limitation of liability; and that the defendant failed to
comply with the requirements of the Convention regarding the ticket, citing
Lisi. The court also held that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable, as
Singapore was the decedent's destination and Singapore was not an ad-
herent to the Warsaw Convention.
The court followed with a bombshell holding the Warsaw Convention
unconstitutional in regard to the plaintiffs because it was in derogation of
their rights under the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the
United States Constitution. The holding of unconstitutionality was based
on two grounds. First, the court held that it would be unconstitutional to
deny plaintiffs the right to bring their action against the defendant airline in
a duly constituted court of the United States which would otherwise have
jurisdiction. Secondly, the court held that it would be unconstitutional to
limit the damages, in this case to the family of a father, husband and
wage-earner, to $8,29 1, regardless of the degree of the true, uncontested,
pecuniary losses. The $16,582 of the Hague Protocol and the $75,000 of
the Montreal. Interim Agreement would, in any event, be inapplicable
because of the facts:
The Court further finds that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
Treaty which would restrict damages in this case to approximately $8,300 are
unconstitutional and therefore not enforceable because they violate the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. The
Court finds that such provisions are arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious and
indefensible as applied to this case, in that such provisions would attempt to
impose a damage limitation of considerably less than the undisputed
pecuniary losses and damages involved in this case. Such unjustifiable, prefer-
ential treatment of airlines is unconstitutional.
Hence, the Burdell decision initiated a new attack upon the Warsaw
Convention, that of unconstitutionality. Under this decision, the rationale
of non-delivery and illegibility of the Mertens, Warren, and Lisi decisions
are no longer needed to defeat limitation of liability. A new tool of uncon-
stitutionality to defeat limitations was provided to fit the situation in which
there was proper and adequate delivery and legibility of a ticket containing
the required statement.
III. A Critique and Suggested Arrangement
The recent history of American adjudications relating to the Warsaw
Convention shows the tendency of the courts to refuse strict construction
of the Convention provisions when inadequate awards would result for
injuries and death in international air travel.
The injustices in air law relating to personal injuries and death in in-
ternational travel are primarily due to the limitation provisions of the
Warsaw Convention upon which the Hague Protocol and Montreal Interim
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Agreement have been engrafted. Obviously, an award of $8,291 under the
Warsaw Convention, or of $16,582 under the Hague Protocol to, for
example, a surviving wife and four children is inadequate; and for that
matter so would be $75,000 under the Montreal Interim Agreement, even
without regard to the legal fees and costs involved.
However, in the case of the Montreal Interim Agreement, there has
been added a new, extremely valuable benefit to those injured, that of
liability without fault. Regardless of fault or negligence, under the Montreal
Interim Agreement an air carrier is liable up to $75,000 upon the showing
of injury or death of a passenger. Considering the pitfalls of lawsuits and
the difficulties of proving negligence, the problem of establishing liability in
a typical negligence action is greater to a plaintiff than is the problem of an
inadequate verdict. Hence, the provisions of the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment, it is submitted, represent real progress.
But much more needs to be done. Clearly, the limit of $75,000 is far
below a reasonable limitation even with the condition of absolute liability.
After all, a plaintiff would not automatically receive the limitation figure.
His compensation would be only up to the limitation figure. A doubling or
tripling of the present limitation of $75,000 would seem to be reasonable.
Whatever the amount, some reasonable figure would need to be set, and for
those for whom an award of even double or triple the present figure would
be inadequate, commercial flight insurance would be available.
In any event, the most important aspect of the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment remains that of absolute liability, and the limitation figure must
ultimately be redetermined by reasonable men to be as fair as possible to
both the carrier and the passenger in the context of the public policy of
encouraging the growth of, and investment in, the international air travel
industry.
Aside from the matter of inadequate awards, there are numerous in-
consistencies in the present law of air injury and death. The eminent
American expert in this field, John J. Kennelly, has devoted most of a
chapter in his newly published Litigation And Trial OfAir Crash Cases9 to
these problems.
If, for instance, a passenger were killed on a flight from New York to
Chile, his surviving family could sue for unlimited damages because Chile
is a non-signatory nation to the Warsaw Convention. If, on the other hand,
the flight were to Argentina, the $75,000 limitation would apply, because
Argentina is an adherent to the Warsaw Convention, and there was a
contact with the United States where the flight originated.
9Chapter 7- International Air Travel Damage Limitations
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In the event that the same passenger had purchased a ticket in London
for a flight to Paris and was killed thereon, his surviving family could sue
for only $16,582, because both the United Kingdom and France are signa-
tories to the Hague Protocol and the flight had no contact with the United
States. Had this same passenger been killed on a flight originating outside
the United States, from one country to another both signatories to the
Warsaw Convention but not the Hague Protocol, his surviving family
would be limited to a recovery of $8,291.
These inconsistencies are compounded by the factor of negligence. If, in
the latter example, the airline was negligent, the limitation would never-
theless still be $8,29 1. However, an international flight having a contact
with the United States would have a limitation of $75,000, even if the
airline were not negligent as long as it was a signatory to the Montreal
Interim Agreement. Everything considered, it would seem that the fairest
arrangement is that of the Montreal Interim Agreement, absolute liability
combined with a reasonable limitation.
It is recognized that juries and judges may differ among themselves as
to findings of fact in the same situation. Hence, without the applicability of
absolute liability, a plaintiff could be denied any award whatever by a
jury-finding of no negligence. Much of the rationale of the doctrine of
absolute liability is embodied in the workmen's compensation laws
throughout the United States; and there is increasing call for application of
the doctrine of liability without fault in automobile accident cases. This
principle of absolute liability with reasonable limitations should not be
restricted to international air travel, but should serve as a basis for intra-
national air travel as well.
Regarding the constitutionality of the suggested arrangement, it is sub-
mitted that analogous arrangements are deeply imbedded in American
maritime law. As to absolute liability of an airline, there is some similarity
to the doctrine of unseaworthiness in admiralty. Under the latter doctrine,
a shipowner is absolutely liable to a seaman for his injuries brought about
by the unseaworthiness of a ship without regard to the possible negligence
vel non of a shipowner. Thus, even without negligence on the part of the
shipowner, he is absolutely liable for a seaman's injuries brought about by
a ship's unseaworthiness. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,'0 the Supreme
Court of the United States explained the philosophy of this doctrine to be
that the shipowner, and not the seaman, is in a position to distribute the
cost of a seaman's injuries to the shipping cdmmunity which receives the
10328 U.S. 85, rehig. den. 328 U.S. 878.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 5
Attacks by American Courts on the Warsaw Convention
seaman's services, and this community should carry and distribute the cost
of the injuries.'1
As to limited liability, there has been in effect since before the Civil War,
specifically March 3, 1851, the "Limitation of Shipowners' Liability
Act."'1 2 Section 183 thereof provides generally that the liability of a ship-
owner for personal injuries and damage to property, done or incurred
without the privity or knowledge of the shipowner, shall not exceed the
value of the interest of the shipowner in the vessel and her freight then
pending.
The constitutionality of this section was upheld by the Supreme Court
as an exercise by Congress of the power to regulate commerce.' 3 A prime
purpose of Section 183 is to encourage investments in shipbuilding and the
promotion of the employment of vessels in commerce, quite similar to one
of the purposes of the Warsaw Convention. Further, there is an interesting
similarity between the "willful-misconduct" provision of the Warsaw Con-
vention, and the "privity-or-knowledge" provision of the Shipowners' Lia-
bility Act. Violation of either provision provides for unlimited liability of
the airline or shipowner as the case may be. The availability of limitations
in maritime proceedings surely constitutes an adequate precedent for limit-
ed liability of airlines.
It is submitted that since the philosophy and rationale of the suggested
arrangement of absolute liability with limitations has so long been part of
American maritime law, an eventual final determination of the con-
stitutionality of similar concepts in air law would result in a holding of their
validity.
"For additional cases in this field see the annotation commencing 98 L. ed. 160. While it
remains necessary, to be entitled to recovery, to show unseaworthiness, once shown it creates
a conclusive presumption of fault without proof of causative negligence.
1246 U.S.C. 181 et seq.
13 01d Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co.
v. Hill Mfg., 109 U.S. 578 (1883).
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